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INTRODUCTION 
You know you made a good choice to participate in a symposium 
when you find the mere title of the symposium stimulating. That is my 
happy circumstance. I see intellectual property (IP) law as an 
interesting hybrid of public law and private law; though, in the end, if 
forced to choose one label, I would call it fundamentally private law. 
Even so, I also believe strongly in acknowledging and in some cases 
repairing those aspects of IP law that affect resource distribution. And 
for IP law, “public values” could not be a more relevant topic. A lively 
recent debate asks what are the ultimate normative foundations of the 
field, pitting welfare maximization against more deontological values; 
yet, though students of IP law argue forcefully over which public 
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values are the heart of the field, few or none argue that the field has 
nothing to do with public values at all. There is tacit agreement that 
the bulk and complexity of the IP system cannot be justified without 
resort to some grand, overarching purpose. The rewards to authors and 
inventors, the licensing transactions and other business deals built on 
IP rights, and the employment of public administrative and judicial 
resources to resolve disputes all have significance beyond the money 
earned by creative people. Likewise, the businesses and industries 
built on protecting intangible assets, and the outcomes of individual 
enforcement actions impact numerous players in the IP ecosystem, and 
not just creative professionals. All of these are the operational gears 
and pulleys of the IP machine, but the machine itself has a higher 
purpose. It is in place to enact, promote, and reflect public values. 
The tradition in IP scholarship provides two primary ways to 
discuss issues such as these. One is to talk about the Big Picture: to 
look at the overall shape of IP law (or one of its constituent parts, i.e., 
patent, copyright, etc.) with an eye toward understanding its 
fundamental driving principles and unified conceptual structure. The 
other is to plunge with vigor into a single issue or doctrine, in an 
attempt to understand the complex issues encoded into it. In this short 
symposium piece, I am going to choose the latter. I will use a single 
issue in IP law to see what it can tell us about the interaction between 
distribution, public values, and private law.  
The issue is international IP treaties. More particularly, I will 
look into the delegation of national sovereignty in each of two major 
treaties, the Paris Convention of 1883 and the Trade Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property (TRIPs) Agreement of 1995. In terms of the 
themes in this Article, my major points are these: 
 
1. The distributive impact of the two treaties operates at the level 
of global consumers and global IP creators; the treaties thus 
deviate from the conventional conception of redistribution, 
which tends to focus on distributive impacts within individual 
countries. This is both a novel, global conception of 
redistribution and a significant deviation from the 
nationalist/mercantilist roots of national IP systems, 
especially as reflected in the history of early patent statutes 
around the world. 
 
2. The aim of both treaties is to facilitate acquisition and (in the 
case of TRIPs) enforcement of IP rights by non-nationals. The 
stated objective is to give non-nationals rights as similar as 
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possible to those of nationals (“national treatment”). The Paris 
Convention, which has the limited goal of making it easier for 
a citizen of one country to acquire IP rights in other countries, 
grew out of a cosmopolitan movement in the late nineteenth 
century that emphasized the sharing of knowledge and 
information. It was originally an adjunct of the international 
science and technology exposition movement, and can be said 
to reflect the public value of encouraging the exchange of 
ideas. It does this by preserving the chance for a non-national 
to obtain a patent on terms equal to those of a citizen of the 
patent-granting state. 
 
3. The TRIPs treaty has been criticized since before it was 
ratified for transferring too much lawmaking power to private 
(read: corporate) hands. It represents (in this view) the 
ascension of a political economy in which public international 
lawmaking has been hijacked by private interests.1 Though I 
surely see flaws in the TRIPs Agreement, I would defend it 
from the strongest of these claims. It has served companies in 
IP-intensive industries, true, but it has conferred benefits on 
many countries outside of Europe, the United States, and 
Japan. It has helped spur some countries forward in the 
evolution of high value-added industries, as intended. And it 
has helped create conditions that encourage overseas 
investment.  
 
IP treaties help non-citizens acquire IP rights. In the case of 
TRIPs, the treaty governs to some extent the standards under which 
those rights are granted. To achieve these goals, individual countries 
had to agree to abide by a common set of procedures (Paris 
Convention) and rules/doctrines (TRIPs). Thus in the end, though the 
treaties aim to facilitate the grant of classic private law entitlements, 
they achieve that end by demanding the surrender of some degree of 
discretion at the national level (i.e., the discretion to treat non-citizens 
differently from citizens). They can thus be seen as requiring the 
surrender of some national sovereignty, in exchange for membership 
in a semi-globalized system of IP protection. 
As we will see, the treaties emerged from vastly different eras, 
and so in my view they make vastly different demands on countries 
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wishing to sign on to them. The Paris Convention has a narrow focus: 
facilitating IP acquisition by non-nationals. It requires only a small 
surrender of sovereignty, just that degree of discretion that would 
allow a national IP system to treat non-nationals differently. TRIPs is 
more ambitious and demands a greater surrender of sovereign 
discretion. TRIPs goes beyond the “procedural fairness” of the Paris 
Convention, stipulating minimum substantive standards and providing 
(at least in theory) an enforcement mechanism for compliance. 
We will get to a discussion of how the surrender of sovereignty 
affects resource distribution and to a review of the public values this 
system embodies. For now, I can summarize by saying that individual 
states have the right to choose whether to opt into these IP treaties. 
They do so through classic public law mechanisms (i.e., treaty 
consideration, ratification, and accession). And they do so for reasons 
reflecting public values: a decision to value creative contributors, from 
home and abroad; a belief that free exchange of information benefits 
the domestic polity; and so on. But these values are put in practice 
through the award of IP rights—which as I said, I consider essentially 
private law rights. So, the public values embodied in national 
sovereignty and the right to partially surrender it are expressed 
ultimately through the vehicle of individual private law rights. 
To understand the relationship between sovereignty and national 
IP systems, we need to first go back to the early days of patent 
protection. It is against this decidedly non-cosmopolitan, non-globalist 
backdrop that the treaties we are interested in first arose. 
I. PATENT TREATIES AND NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY 
Patent law began as a strictly mercantilist policy instrument. The 
granting of rights or privileges by the state was understood to be for 
the benefit of the granting state and its citizens and no one else. But 
by the late nineteenth century, state self-interest expanded to include 
protection of domestic inventors whose products were increasingly 
sold on international markets. So, in the first wave of international 
harmonization, culminating in the Paris Convention of 1883, 
individual nations made common cause to streamline patenting of 
inventions in multiple jurisdictions. A small degree of state 
sovereignty was surrendered, in exchange for a regime that in theory 
might benefit inventors in all member states of the Convention. Then 
in the 1990s, the second wave of patent harmonization crested with 
the TRIPs Treaty, part of the Uruguay Round of agreements that 
created the World Trade Organization. By linking new, substantive 
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standards for IP protection with other trade preferences and policies, 
TRIPs appealed to the diverging national interests of signatory 
nations. To bridge this divergence, TRIPs required a greater surrender 
of sovereignty than the Paris Convention. A more thoroughgoing quid 
pro quo is latent in the text and background of TRIPs as compared to 
Paris. 
The differences between the Paris Convention and TRIPs raise 
some important questions. How exactly do international patent treaties 
constrain the discretion of sovereign nations? And how powerful are 
these constraints in the case of each individual treaty? More 
importantly, how powerful should they be? 
I look at two specific problems in sovereignty to provide 
answers. The Paris Convention defines an international priority filing 
as the basis for the right to file counterpart patent applications in 
Convention member states. Yet, national laws are in conflict over rules 
for determining invention ownership at the time of the international 
filing. Should the law of the priority application country be used to 
determine ownership, or the law of each subsequent country where a 
counterpart is filed? 
TRIPs requires signatory countries to apply three traditional 
requirements of patentability, novelty, inventive step 
(nonobviousness), and utility. Canadian courts have applied a variant 
on this latter requirement, utility, almost exclusively to 
pharmaceutical patents.2 The Canadian version of the test resulted in 
a skyrocketing invalidity rate for these patents when compared to 
historical norms. Should the traditional parameters of the utility 
doctrine limit the ability of Canada’s sovereign courts to craft doctrine 
in this area? 
I believe that the Paris Convention was drafted in an era when 
national sovereignty was a stronger baseline assumption in 
international patent law. So, it should arguably be interpreted in a way 
that preserves as much sovereign discretion as possible. There is a very 
plausible argument that the text of the Convention supports applying 
the law of the international priority country to the question of 
ownership of invention rights. But under the sovereignty-maximizing 
interpretive rule I would apply to the Convention, there is a good case 
 
 2. In 2017 the Canadian Supreme Court jettisoned the promise utility 
doctrine that had been at the center of the Eli Lilly arbitration. See AstraZeneca 
Canada Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., [2017] S.C.R. 36 (Can. S.C.C.); see also discussion infra 
note 50.  
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that each subsequent country where an application is filed should be 
permitted to apply its own rules of ownership. 
TRIPs requires greater surrender of sovereignty. Thus, I would 
support a TRIPs arbitration panel in finding that Canada is out of 
compliance with the Agreement because its courts have stretched and 
disfigured the traditional utility standard so essentially that it is not a 
utility test at all. I recognize, however, that TRIPs leaves much greater 
discretion in other doctrinal areas of patent law, in particular 
disclosure/enablement, which suggests that future Canadian cases 
might well invalidate at least some pharmaceutical patents on the basis 
of enablement rather than lack of utility. 
So, how much sovereignty does a nation surrender when signing 
an international patent treaty? The answer depends on the text of the 
treaty, but also on what that text (and other surrounding facts) tells us 
about background assumptions concerning sovereignty at the time of 
signing. If harmonization continues in the future—not a sure thing 
from the vantage point of 2020—the same analysis will apply to any 
treaties that are signed. In the constant push and pull between patent 
law’s mercantilist roots, and its globalizing aspirations, the historical 
moment of treaty-making will leave a lasting mark. 
A. Paris, 1883 
The history of patent harmonization tracks the growth in 
international trade over time. Until 1800, there was a long period 
characterized by persistently low international trade flows. According 
to most estimates, the sum of exports and imports throughout the 
world before 1810 never exceeded more than 10% of global annual 
GDP.3 This changed over the course of the nineteenth century, when 
technological advances triggered a period of marked growth in world 
trade, in what has been called the “first wave of globalization.”4 The 
Paris Convention of 1883 was a creature of its time: the coming of 
globalization to the patent world. 
 
 3. See Esteban Ortiz-Ospina, Diane Beltekian & Max Roser, Trade and 
Globalization, OUR WORLD IN DATA 14 (2018), https://ourworldindata.org/ 
international-trade#data-sources [https://perma.cc/UH3M-HHGA]. 
 4. David S. Jacks, Christopher M. Meissner & Dennis Novy, Trade Costs 
in the First Wave of Globalization 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 
No. 12602, 2006); see ANGUS MADDISON, THE WORLD ECONOMY: A MILLENNIAL 
PERSPECTIVE 95–101 (2001) (describing global growth in trade and GDP between 
1820 and 1913). 
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The first wave of globalization came to a screeching halt with 
the beginning of the First World War. The decline of free trade 
liberalism, and the rise of nationalism, presaged not only war but also 
economic stagnation. There was a sizeable reduction on international 
trade in the interwar period. After the Second World War, trade 
growth picked up once again. Advances in communications (e.g., 
worldwide phone lines, satellite technology, mobile phones, and the 
Internet) and transportation (e.g., containerization, larger ocean 
transport vessels, and road construction) spread the word and paved 
the way for an ever-growing stream of international trade. Today the 
sum of exports and imports across nations is higher than 50% of global 
GNP.5 Put another way, over half of the goods and services consumed 
in the world originate somewhere other than the place of consumption.  
It was against this broad backdrop that representatives from 
eleven nations gathered in Paris in 1883. But in this broader context, 
two more proximate causes precipitated the drafting of the 
Convention. The first was the wave of international scientific, 
technical, and cultural “expositions” that so excited and stimulated the 
developed world in the nineteenth century. And the second was the 
formation of postal and telegraph unions, at the transnational level, for 
coordination of transnational communication.6 
The great expositions of the nineteenth century occurred in 
London (1851), Vienna (1873), and Paris (1878). The goal of these 
events was to showcase, in one place, the “state of the art” in many 
diverse fields and to teach interested people from many countries the 
most up-to-date ideas and technologies. Although there was 
widespread excitement among participants,7 exhibitors were 
concerned that their ideas would be shown without any form of legal 
protection.8 The risk of piracy was explicitly reflected in a number of 
bilateral and provisional forms of protection, which were put in place 
prior to the exhibitions in a hasty and ad hoc sort of way.9 The 
inadequacy of these solutions was apparent to all, so a convocation of 
 
 5. See Ortiz-Ospina, Beltekian & Roser, supra note 3. 
 6. See SAM RICKETSON, THE PARIS CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF 
INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY: A COMMENTARY 5–6 (2015). 
 7. Petra Moser, How Do Patent Laws Influence Innovation? Evidence from 
Nineteenth-Century World’s Fairs, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 1214, 1216 (Sept. 2005) (“At 
a time when London had fewer than two million inhabitants, [the 1851 “Crystal 
Palace” Exhibition] attracted more than six million people . . . .”). 
 8. See RICKETSON, supra note 6, at 30. 
 9. See id. at 25–30. 
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experts was called in conjunction with the Vienna Exhibition of 1873. 
This led directly to a parallel meeting in Paris in 1878, which produced 
the first draft of what would become the Paris Convention of 1883. 
The elites who ran these meetings—there was usually a Baron this, or 
Count Von that, at the lectern—did not speak explicitly of the need to 
surrender some degree of national sovereignty to achieve uniformity. 
They spoke only of protecting inventors and entrepreneurs, and of the 
obvious need to somehow coordinate parallel national patent filings. 
But the solutions they arrived at reflected an implicit understanding 
that they were to solve a limited problem, and that as a result only 
fairly minimal commitments would be required of the prospective 
member nations. 
It is often said that the Paris Convention reflects only limited 
substantive harmonization, and that its overall impact falls primarily 
on patent procedures. There is a sense in which this is true; for 
example, no country commits to employing an inventive step (or 
nonobviousness) requirement, let alone agrees on how stringently to 
apply such a standard. At the same time, it is generally understood that 
a sovereign nation may treat its citizens differently from those of other 
nations. The very idea of citizenship shows as much. Thus, when a 
country agrees to treat non-nationals just as it treats citizens, it does 
commit to a restriction in its sovereign prerogatives. Thus the central 
idea of the Paris Convention, the national treatment principle of 
Article 2,10 does represent the surrender of some national discretion. 
Likewise, it is certainly within the purview of a national 
government to require that legal documents be filed in an office of the 
government, in order to give those documents effect within the 
country. And so, the concept of international priority in Article 4,11 
perhaps the most widely used feature of the Paris Convention, also 
represents a small concession of sovereign power. 
Yet both of these important components of the 1883 Convention 
can also be seen as fairly minimalist intrusions into sovereignty. 
National treatment requires no change in the substantive law applied 
to a nation’s citizens; it just requires non-citizens to be treated equally. 
And the international priority system makes no demands on the details 
or requirements of patent prosecution. It merely requires that an initial 
filing in another Convention country be given the same effect as if it 
were made initially in the national patent office. It should also be 
 
 10. See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property art. 2, Mar. 
20, 1883, 21 U.S.T. 1583 (last revised Sept. 28, 1979). 
 11. Id. at art. 4. 
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mentioned that the Convention adopts a “national option” solution for 
compulsory working and compulsory licensing.12 This was adopted 
intentionally as a compromise between the forces of “nationalism” and 
“internationalism”—a further sign of the limits of sovereign surrender 
embedded in the text of the Convention.13 
After the successful conclusion of the Paris Convention in the 
late nineteenth century, further efforts at harmonizing worldwide 
patent law bore little fruit for nearly another century. This lull in 
activity was in part due to the success of the Paris Convention, which 
established a sufficient legal framework so that inventors and their 
firms could obtain some level of effective protection in most 
commercially important countries. Yet, the process for obtaining 
protection remained quite cumbersome. Patent applications still had to 
be filed in every jurisdiction in which protection was desired, and 
applicants still had to deal with the divergent rules and standards of 
the world’s many individual patent jurisdictions. Nevertheless, the 
international business community seemed to have little interest in 
investing time and resources for further consolidation and 
harmonization of world patent law. And perhaps too, the world’s 
nations were not ready in the first half of the twentieth century for the 
kind of international cooperation necessary to consolidate and 
harmonize global patent standards. 
The next major developments would not occur until the 1970s. 
That decade saw two international agreements concluded—the Patent 
 
 12. See id. at arts. 5(A)(2), 5(A)(4). 
(2) Each country of the Union shall have the right to take legislative 
measures providing for the grant of compulsory licenses to prevent the 
abuses which might result from the exercise of the exclusive rights 
conferred by the patent, for example, failure to work. . . . 
(4) A compulsory license may not be applied for on the ground of failure to 
work or insufficient working before the expiration of a period of four years 
from the date of filing of the patent application or three years from the date 
of the grant of the patent, whichever period expires last; it shall be refused 
if the patentee justifies his inaction by legitimate reasons. 
Id. 
 13. See EDITH TILTON PENROSE, THE ECONOMICS OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
PATENT SYSTEM 60–87 (1951) (describing the very instructive history of the 
Convention). 
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Cooperation Treaty or PCT,14 and the European Patent Convention or 
EPC.15  
Both of these innovations were directed to the same problem—
the burden on applicants of having to file numerous applications to 
obtain transnational patent protection. Both were also variations of the 
same solution—consolidation of various national processes into a 
single international mechanism. 
Of the two solutions, the PCT is the less dramatic, though it 
applies to more countries. It establishes an international application 
process by which inventors may file a single patent application in any 
patent office of a jurisdiction bound by the agreement. The PCT 
application process has two phases: an “international phase,” during 
which an international searching authority (which can be the national 
patent office) conducts a prior art search; and the “national phase,” 
during which the applicant must prosecute the application through the 
patent office of each country where protection is sought. In essence, 
the PCT provides a uniform procedural framework for filing 
applications in multiple nations and consolidates one aspect of patent 
prosecution: prior art searching. The PCT does not, however, 
eliminate the necessity of separately prosecuting multiple national 
applications to obtain protection in multiple countries.16  
In contrast to the PCT, the European Patent Convention is far 
more aggressive in establishing a transnational patent process. It 
establishes a centralized office for patent prosecution for each of its 
thirty-eight member states, the European Patent Office (EPO), which 
performs the normal administrative tasks of searching the prior art, 
examining the application, and determining patentability. If the 
examination process concludes in favor of the applicant, the EPO is 
authorized to issue a patent that provides rights in all EPC countries 
designated by the applicant. The applicant does not have to go through 
any additional prosecution in the national offices. 
 
 14. See generally Patent Cooperation Treaty, June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645, 
1160 U.N.T.S. 231. 
 15. See EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, http://www.european-patent-
office.org/legal/epc/e/ma1.html [https://perma.cc/UV8M-QYSD] (last visited Mar. 2, 
2020). 
 16. The PCT has been a modest success. For example, the USPTO received 
in fiscal year 2006 about 52,000 PCT international applications—a substantial 
number that is nonetheless dwarfed by the over 417,000 domestic applications filed 
in the same year. USPTO, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FISCAL YEAR 
2006 16 (2006). But applicants are often drawn to the PCT application process not 
because of its simplicity but because of its procedural benefits in delaying patent 
prosecution at the national level. 
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There are two major limitations on the EPC. First, it applies only 
to thirty-eight European nations; the PCT, by contrast, applies to more 
than a hundred nations.17 Second, the EPC unifies only the 
administrative functions of national patent systems. The European 
patent issued by the EPO is not, in theory, a single transnational patent 
but a “bundle” of national patents that are enforced through the various 
national courts of the EPC countries. The nations of Europe are 
considering other measures that would further unify their patent 
systems. For example, the proposed Unified Patent and Unified Patent 
Court (UPC) would establish true European-wide patents, with 
centralized enforcement. Agreements establishing the unified patent 
and unified court have been signed in Europe; but neither has yet 
entered into force because the requisite thirteen countries have not yet 
ratified the agreements.18 
Both the PCT and the EPC were directed to consolidating the 
international process of patent prosecution. In the 1980s and 1990s, 
however, the targets of reform changed; the international business 
community began to tackle the more ambitious project of 
harmonization, i.e., creating uniform substantive standards of 
intellectual property protection. The change in goals had a number of 
catalysts. Intellectual property was increasing in value and was 
beginning to take on a more central role in business planning and 
strategy. The establishment of the Federal Circuit in 1982 was both a 
consequence of this trend, and a partial cause of its continuation. 
Moreover, world trade was becoming increasingly important to the 
economies of the United States and other industrialized nations. 
Markets in developing countries were no longer insignificant, and 
these countries had traditionally resisted strong intellectual property 
protection. This led to a new wave of harmonization that culminated 
in an historical treaty signed in 1995. 
 
 17. See EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, Member States of the European Patent 
Organization, https://www.epo.org/about-us/foundation/member-states.html [https:// 
perma.cc/VDL5-R6AM] (last visited Mar. 2, 2020); WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. 
ORG., The PCT Now Has 153 Contracting States, https://www.wipo.int/ 
pct/en/pct_contracting_states.html [https://perma.cc/GPF5-RU4T] (last visited Mar. 
2, 2020). 
 18. See generally Council Directive 16351/12 of Jan. 11, 2013, Agreement 
on a Unified Patent Court. 
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B. Uruguay, 1995 
To pursue harmonization, the business community in the United 
States and Europe needed a new institutional structure. This 
community thought that the existing structure—the World Intellectual 
Property Organization—would not do. WIPO was created in 1970 as 
the successor organization to the United International Bureau for the 
Protection of Intellectual Property, which had been established in 
1893 to administer the Paris Convention and the Berne Convention for 
the Protection of Artistic and Literary Works, the primary 
international copyright treaty created in 1886. WIPO’s work in patent 
law had largely been limited to educational efforts; the many newly 
formed nations from the 1960s and 1970s were thought to need 
instruction on the ways and means of national patent systems. Then in 
1974, WIPO officially became a specialized agency of the United 
Nations—a forum not thought to be particularly friendly to Western 
business interests. 
Aware of the increasing importance of intellectual property and 
of WIPO’s slow progress in harmonization throughout the 1970s and 
1980s, the business community was on the lookout for an alternative 
institutional structure for harmonization. When influential CEOs from 
twelve large U.S. companies came together to strengthen IP rights, 
they settled on a novel solution: grafting IP onto issues of international 
trade. The reasoning behind formation of this powerful club, known 
simply as the IP Committee, was sound. The members knew that a 
major new trade treaty was in the works under the auspices of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). And they knew that 
corporate interests had much greater clout in the GATT negotiation 
process than they did at WIPO. Thus was born the germ of the idea 
that later grew into the GATT treaty on Trade Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property (TRIPs). 
The details of the “IP as trade” campaign are quite interesting. 
The complex effort to sell the idea to U.S. negotiators, national 
governments, and professional groups shows just how much the 
members of the IP Committee valued stronger IP rights. While many 
argue that negotiators from developing countries did not fully perceive 
the import of what they were agreeing to in the IP area, it is also true 
that lowered tariffs for agricultural and manufacturing exports were a 
powerful incentive to strengthen national IP regimes. Regardless of 
the process, and putting aside for a moment whether TRIPs was in the 
self-interest of many of its signatories, the end result is quite 
significant. TRIPs represents a concession of sovereignty in the IP 
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field on the part of many countries that goes very far beyond the 
limited national impact of the Paris Convention of 1883. A good deal 
of national discretion was traded away in exchange for membership in 
the TRIPs club. 
The catalogue of TRIPs minimum requirements is long and well-
known. The Agreement ended the wide variation in the treatment of 
pharmaceutical inventions across the world, to name one much-noted 
example. But perhaps the biggest change to international IP law was 
in enforcement. The WTO Dispute Settlement Board (DSB) is 
authorized to receive complaints, arbitrate disputes, and—most 
importantly—assess compensatory remedies for violations of TRIPs. 
The Paris Convention, designed to appeal to national self-interest in a 
limited sphere, never really needed much enforcement. But the much 
meatier TRIPs obligations, it was understood, would be a much more 
tempting target for corner-cutting or outright defiance. And so, the 
DSB was created. 
DSB remedies can take many forms, as can be seen from a 
sampling of IP-related cases. In the infamous “US – Section 110(5) of 
the U.S. Copyright Act” case, the passage of a revised public 
performance provision in U.S. copyright law was successfully 
challenged by the European Union.19 Shrinking the public 
performance right, by eliminating royalties from some business 
establishments, harmed holders of composition copyrights in the EU.20 
The penalty was a one-time payment of $2.3 million for three years’ 
worth of harm, together with a formal demand that the United States 
amend its Copyright Act to come back into compliance with TRIPs.21 
A few years after the DSB decision, the United States Trade 
Representative (U.S.T.R.), responsible for TRIPs matters, reported 
that it was still in consultation with Congress. Presumably, those 
consultations are ongoing in a formal sense, but not in any real sense; 
there, the matter has stood for over thirteen years, with the U.S.T.R. 
 
 19. See Dispute Settlement, United States—Section 110(5) of the US 
Copyright Act—Recourse to Arbitration Under the DSU, WTO Doc. WT/DS160 
(Nov. 9, 2001), https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds160_e.htm 
[https://perma.cc/9NT8-HT2F]. 
 20. See WORLD TRADE ORG., US – Section 110(5) Copyright Act (DS160), in 
WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: ONE-PAGE CASE SUMMARIES (1995–2018) 66 (2019). 
 21. The EU suspended further arbitration because the parties were working 
toward a mutually satisfactory agreement. Dispute Settlement, supra note 19 (“The 
United States has thereafter presented status reports to the DSB informing that the US 
Administration will work closely with the US Congress and will continue to confer 
with the European Union in order to reach a mutually satisfactory resolution of this 
matter.”). 
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webpage still reporting this as a “pending” matter.22 The lesson being 
that, though TRIPs has more teeth than the Paris Convention, it is not 
exactly a tiger. It is more like an eight-week-old kitten. Even so, some 
consequences are better than no consequences. Nations do not yield 
sovereignty in large dollops, and the sovereignty they do cede is at 
times meted out in little dribs and drabs. Such is the pace of progress 
in the world of IP harmonization. 
Although the post-TRIPs amendments in domestic U.S. law are 
important, they pale in comparison to the revolutionary changes the 
agreement makes to the intellectual property regimes of many 
developing countries. To summarize the highlights, all signatories of 
the Uruguay Round treaty (which, under the agreement, become 
members of the newly created World Trade Organization) are 
obligated to: 
 
• Include virtually all important commercial fields within the 
ambit of patentable subject matter, a major change for those 
countries that have traditionally refused to enforce 
pharmaceutical patents on public health/access grounds;  
• Test patent applications for the presence of an “inventive 
step” and “industrial application,” which are expressly 
defined as synonymous with the U.S. requirements of, 
respectively, nonobviousness and utility;  
• Curtail the practice of granting compulsory licenses for 
patented technology, by (1) requiring a good faith attempt to 
license voluntarily, (2) limiting duration, (3) requiring 
termination if conditions change, and (4) requiring 
compensation, subject to judicial review.23 
 
 22. See Section 110(5) of US Copyright Act, OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., 
https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/enforcement/dispute-settlement-proceedings/united-
states-section-1105-us-copyright-ac [https://perma.cc/5MSZ-94VB] (last visited 
Mar. 2, 2020) (“Dispute Status: Pending”); see also Dispute Settlement, supra note 
19 (noting the “[c]urrent status” of DSB 160 as “Authorization to retaliate requested 
(including 22.6 arbitration)”). This is all a little like saying (hypothetically—this is 
made up) that the 1976 U.S. Presidential election is still “pending” because the 
Socialist Workers Party never conceded the result, unhappy that its official .2% vote 
tally did not match its own internal calculations that it had instead earned .3%. 
 23. See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Annex 1C: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights arts. 27, 31, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter GATT]. 
This Article has since been amended by the inclusion of new Article 41bis, which 
permits WTO member states greater discretion in requiring compulsory licensing of 
patents covering drugs that are to be exported to countries meeting the original 
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TRIPs also requires signatory nations to establish certain civil 
and administrative procedures; to provide parties access to evidence 
held by opposing parties; to make available injunctions, damages, 
preliminary relief, and other remedies for acts of infringement; to 
impose certain border control measures; and to establish criminal 
penalties in the case of counterfeited copyrighted goods.24 In short, 
TRIPs thoroughly regulates the domestic intellectual property law of 
the signatory nations. 
II. SOVEREIGNTY AFTER PARIS: INTERNATIONAL PRIORITY AND 
INVENTION OWNERSHIP 
We can trace out the effects on sovereignty of the two waves of 
harmonization, through the device of case studies. For the Paris 
Convention, we consider the controversial provision on ownership of 
the international priority right in Article 4. For TRIPs, we use a current 
dispute over the Canadian utility standard as applied to pharmaceutical 
patents. We start with the first example. 
A line of European cases has held that the inventive entity that 
files a priority application must have full assignment of the 
international priority right on the date of filing. In these rulings, any 
later-added inventor must also have assigned his, her, or their priority 
right to the invention claimed in the priority application. And all these 
assignments must be in hand by the time of the priority filing. Under 
these cases, a U.S. inventor who has assigned his or her entire “right, 
title and interest” to an invention, or who is under a duty to assign by 
virtue of a pre-invention employment agreement, is not properly 
within the inventive entity making the priority filing. This is because 
these cases require an explicit post-invention, pre-priority filing of the 
 
compulsory licensing criteria of Article 31. See Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement, 
WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/ 
amendment_e.htm [https://perma.cc/LM5W-HDPY] (last visited Mar. 2, 2020) 
(providing a list of signatory nations under TRIPs that have to date accepted the 
Article 31bis amendment; when two-thirds of the members accept, it will take effect); 
see also Frederick M. Abbott & Jerome H. Reichman, The Doha Round’s Public 
Health Legacy: Strategies for the Production and Diffusion of Patented Medicines 
Under the Amended TRIPS Provisions, 10 J. INT’L ECON. L. 921, 928 (2007). But see 
Ann Marie Effingham, Trips Agreement Article 31(b): The Need for Revision, 46 
SETON HALL L. REV. 883, 884 (2016); Dina Halajian, Inadequacy of TRIPs & the 
Compulsory License: Why Broad Compulsory Licensing Is Not a Viable Solution to 
the Access to Medicine Problem, 38 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1191, 1192 (2013) (critiquing 
TRIPS). 
 24. See GATT, supra note 23, at arts. 42–61. 
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international priority right.25 Without that explicit assignment, the 
assignee that files a foreign counterpart to a U.S. application is missing 
rights from one inventor at the time of the U.S. priority filing. And an 
assignment that comes after the U.S. priority filing comes too late 
because then the inventive entity that owned rights at the time of the 
priority filing is a different inventive entity than the one that files the 
foreign counterpart applications. 
A variation on this occurs when a patent applicant makes 
changes in a patent’s named inventors after the international priority 
filing. Once again, this causes a mismatch between the inventive entity 
that filed the original priority application and the entity that files the 
foreign counterparts. In many of these cases, the later-added inventors 
did not make an explicit assignment of rights in the specific claimed 
invention covered in the priority application as of the time of the 
priority filing—because they were not named inventors as of that time. 
In other words, the only way to have a valid application in Europe, 
based on a first Paris Convention filing in another country, is to have 
received assignments from inventors who did not know they were 
inventors at the time of the initial Convention filing. This is of course 
unlikely. 
These scenarios have led to loss of the international priority date. 
After newly-named inventors have assigned their international priority 
right, the application can be filed again. But it will not receive the 
original priority date. Its effective date will be the date of the second 
(post-assignment) filing. This can be deadly. Intervening prior art—
patents and scientific publications by others, made available after the 
initial (invalid) international priority date but before the new European 
filing date—can kill the patent. 
This result frustrates the expectations of U.S. patent owners. 
First, under U.S. law, the standard assignment of all “right, title and 
interest” in an invention works an assignment of the international 
priority rights.26 And second, under the rules of application ownership 
 
 25. See, e.g., Tribunaux de grande instance [TGI] [ordinary court of original 
jurisdiction] Paris, Jan. 30, 2009, PIBD 2009, 899, III, 1162 (failing to explicitly 
mention international priority right in assignments meant corporate applicant for 
French national patent did not have ownership rights at time of filing and hence the 
French counterpart did not merit the benefit of the U.S. priority filing date). 
 
 26. See, e,g., Popp v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 5 F.2d 
962, 962 (3d Cir. 1925). 
[W]e concur in the opinion of the Circuit Court, that Louis, having sold this 
invention, and doubt existing whether the purchasers would obtain a patent 
for it, intended by this contract and by exhibit D to secure to them the benefit 
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in the United States, pre-assignment of rights (typically in an 
employment agreement signed at commencement of employment) 
vests all future ownership in the corporate employer.27 Hence, U.S. 
law presumes that the international priority right for any later-made 
and later-claimed invention is already “pre-owned” by the corporate 
employer. This is especially important in the absence of an explicit 
assignment of rights in a specific and just-made invention. These 
explicit assignments are customary, even when a blanket pre-
assignment is in place; but sometimes, as with an inventor not named 
in the first (priority) application, no explicit assignment is obtained 
before the first filing, and the employer must rely on blanket pre-
assignments. European case law considers the international priority 
right to be a distinctive and independent right that only passes when 
an inventor explicitly assigns that right by name after an invention and 
before the first priority filing. Failure to meet this condition means that 
the applicant loses the priority date, therefore sacrificing the chief 
benefit accorded compliance with the Paris Convention. 
The dispute between European and U.S. patent interests involves 
a number of legal sources, but the genesis of the issue is Article 4 of 
the Paris Convention, which looks like this: 
A. 
(1) Any person who has duly filed an application for a patent, . . . in one of 
the countries of the Union, or his successor in title, shall enjoy, for the 
purpose of filing in the other countries, a right of priority during the periods 
hereinafter fixed. 
(2) Any filing that is equivalent to a regular national filing under the 
domestic legislation of any country of the Union or under bilateral or 
 
of the exclusive use of that invention . . . so long as [it] was protected by 
any patent founded on his right [as] an inventor. 
Mason & Hamlin Organ Co., 92 U.S. 724, 727–28 (1875) (fourth emphasis added); 
RIDSDALE ELLIS, PATENT ASSIGNMENTS 400 (3d ed. 1955) (“There seems to be one 
essential requirement for the passing of foreign rights without express mention 
thereof, viz., an assignment of the invention.”). 
 27. See FilmTec Corp. v. Allied–Signal Inc., 939 F.2d 1568, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 
1991) (explaining that “[o]nce the invention is made and [the] application for [a] 
patent is filed, . . . legal title to the rights accruing thereunder would be in the 
assignee,” under an employment agreement automatically vesting title in the 
employer at the moment an invention is made, via a clause saying the new employee 
“hereby assigns” his or her interest in future inventions). In addition, U.S. law will 
imply an obligation to assign invention rights even when an inventor has not signed 
an employment agreement, so long as the inventor was, as the cases say, “employed 
to invent.” See, e.g., Teets v. Chromalloy Gas Turbine Corp., 83 F.3d 403, 407 (Fed. 
Cir. 1996). 
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multilateral treaties concluded between countries of the Union shall be 
recognized as giving rise to the right of priority. 
(3) By a regular national filing is meant any filing that is adequate to 
establish the date on which the application was filed in the country 
concerned, whatever may be the subsequent fate of the application. . . . 
D. 
(1) Any person desiring to take advantage of the priority of a previous filing 
shall be required to make a declaration indicating the date of such filing and 
the country in which it was made. Each country shall determine the latest 
date on which such declaration must be made.28 
These parts of the Paris Convention establish two principles. 
First, under Article 4(A)(3), the appropriate law for determining 
whether a patent application establishes a right to priority is the law of 
the country of filing. Article 4(A)(3) provides that the right of priority 
attaches to applications and not merely to specific “persons,” as under 
Article 4(A)(1). It is true that Article 4(A)(1) says that “[a]ny person 
who has duly filed an application for a patent . . . shall enjoy . . . a right 
of priority.”29 But Article 4(A)(2) says that “[a]ny filing that is 
equivalent to a regular national filing under the domestic legislation 
of any country of the Union . . . shall be recognized as giving rise to 
the right of priority.”30 
Under cases such as Edwards Life Sciences AG v. Cook Biotech, 
Inc.,31 European courts have dealt with the following situation. A 
priority application is filed naming multiple inventors. But at the time 
of the priority filing, one or more of those inventors has not yet 
explicitly assigned his or her foreign priority right in the specific 
invention to the employer/assignee. The holding in Edwards was that 
the phrase “[a]ny person” in Article 4(A)(1) means that the right of 
priority attaches only to the legal person having explicit ownership of 
that right on the date of the priority filing.32 Thus, under the facts of 
Edwards and similar cases, assignment of the priority right after the 
date of priority filing comes too late: the “person” who owns the right 
 
 28. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, supra note 10, 
at art. 4. 
 29. Id. at art. 4(A)(1). 
 30. Id. at art. 4(A)(2). 
 31. See generally [2009] EWHC (Pat) 1304, [2009] F.S.R. 27 (appeal taken 
from Eng.). 
 32. See id. at [92]–[93]. 
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after the subsequent assignment is a different “person” than the entity 
who filed the priority application.33 
The problem with this interpretation is that it completely ignores 
the remainder of Article 4. The gist is this: when Article 4(A)(1) says 
“[a]ny person who has duly filed an application for a patent, . . . shall 
enjoy, for the purpose of filing in the other countries, a right of 
priority,” we must look to the remainder of Article 4 to see what “duly 
filed” means.34 In a nutshell, it means: filed in accordance with the 
domestic law of the country of the priority filing. Because domestic 
U.S. law does not require a separate and specific assignment of the 
international priority right, no such assignment is necessary to “duly 
file” a viable application in the United States. Hence, cases like 
Edwards Life Sciences are wrong. 
Article 4(A)(2) says that the way to decide whether a “person” 
has “duly filed” an application is to see if the application by that person 
“is equivalent to a regular national filing under the domestic 
legislation of any country of the Union.”35 If the filing under 4(A)(2), 
by the person under 4(A)(1), is “equivalent to” a regular national 
filing, then 4(A)(2) says that filing “shall be recognized as giving rise 
to the right of priority.”36 
It is perfectly acceptable in the United States to file an 
application without having in place an explicit assignment of rights to 
that specific claimed invention.37 The inventor’s oath or declaration 
 
 33. See also Case T-0062/05, GE Plastics Japan K.K. v. Koninklijke DSM 
N.V., 2006 EPO § 3.13, p. 31, available at http://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-
appeals/pdf/t050062eu1.pdf [https://perma.cc/MF7G-ER36] (decision under EPC 
Article 87, the EPC version of Paris Article 4). Holding that a transfer of rights 
between GE Japan and parent company General Electric, Inc., had not worked a 
transfer of priority rights in the Japanese application on which the EPO application in 
question was based because “although [the purported transfer document] refer[ed], in 
general, to foreign patent applications[, it] fails to specify explicitly the countries for 
which General Electric should indeed file a patent application.” Id. But see Case T-
0205/14, Teva Pharm. Indus. Ltd. v. Hexal AG, 2015 EPO, at § 3.7.6, p. 43, available 
at http://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/pdf/t140205eu1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/U89A-RYKY] (“[T]he right of priority derived from the US 
provisional applications . . . had been transferred to the respondent [by operation of 
the Israeli service invention statute] before the date of filing of the international 
application . . . .”). 
 34. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, supra note 10, 
at art. 4(A)(1) (emphasis added). 
 35. Id. at art. 4(A)(2). 
 36. Id. 
 37. See 37 C.F.R. § 3.73(c) (2012) (requiring proof of chain of title prior to 
action by assignee such as a response to a rejection; title may be proven, e.g., by 
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simply requires a statement that the named inventors believe they are 
the true inventors, and that they understand the contents of the 
application.38 It is tradition to include a copy of an explicit assignment 
of rights to an invention, but it is not required; and of course, the 
traditional assignment of “all right, title and interest” to the invention 
is sufficient to demonstrate that the assignee has full rights in the 
invention and is authorized to prosecute the application. 
Moreover, U.S. prosecution may proceed even without the 
cooperation of an inventor, let alone without an explicit assignment. 
As the Federal Circuit said in Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. Barnes-
Hind/Hydrocurve, Inc.: 
Instances of inventors refusing even to cooperate in obtaining issuance of a 
patent to be owned by an assignee are common and machinery is provided 
in 37 C.F.R. § 1.47 to deal with them. Section 1.47 provides that either a 
joint inventor or a proper assignee may file the application without the 
consent or signature of the inventor, just so the oath or declaration is 
accompanied by a petition including proof of pertinent facts. It is clear, 
therefore, that the PTO does not allow the inventor to erect that type of 
obstacle to obtaining patent protection. Such forethought is necessary, as 
otherwise an inventor’s changed self interest might nullify a proper 
assignment.39 
Under U.S. law, the person who files a priority application may 
also make technical corrections to the patent’s list of inventors.40 
Doing so does not sacrifice the filing person’s filing date. So, under 
the “domestic legislation” of the United States (i.e., Article 4(A)(2)), 
a person may “duly file[]” an application which makes it a “regular 
national filing,” even if the inventive entity on the application changes 
after the initial filing. The only requirement is that the person who files 
must be able to show that it has ownership rights to the work of each 
named inventor of the claimed invention. 
 
evidence of an assignment from the named inventor(s), any time prior to assignee 
action—which typically does not begin until a year or more after filing). 
 38. 37 C.F.R. § 1.63 (2015) (explaining an “[i]nventor’s oath or 
declaration”). 
 39. Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. Barnes-Hind/Hydrocurve, Inc., 796 F.2d 443, 
447 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 823 (1989). The 
situation in Bausch & Lomb is now handled under 37 C.F.R. § 1.64 (2012) (providing 
for a substitute statement of facts in lieu of inventor’s oath or declaration). The rules 
regarding assignee prosecution of applications were liberalized under the AIA. 
 40. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.41(b) (2015) and 37 C.F.R. § 1.48(a) (2013) (providing 
original filing and change of inventorship provisions); see also Manual of Patent 
Examination Procedures § 6.02.01(c) (providing an explanation of “[c]orrection of 
Inventorship”). 
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In sum, a “regular national filing” under Article 4(A)(2) of the 
Paris Convention need not, in the United States, come prior to 
assignment of the priority filing right. Article 4(A)(3) of the 
Convention says: “By a regular national filing is meant any filing that 
is adequate to establish the date on which the application was filed in 
the country concerned, whatever may be the subsequent fate of the 
application.” A U.S. application made prior to assignment of a priority 
right is unquestionably a “filing that is adequate to establish the date 
on which the application was filed.” 
Article 4(A)(2) and 4(A)(3) arguably establish that the law of the 
country of filing is the proper place to look to determine whether the 
filing made by the “person” under Article 4(A)(1) is capable of 
establishing a right of priority. Article 4(A)(2) provides that “the 
domestic legislation of any country of the Union” controls, while 
Article 4(A)(3) states that it is “adequate to establish the date on which 
the application was filed in the country concerned.”41 So, the problem 
with cases such as Edwards is that they look at Article 4(A)(1) in 
isolation instead of in context. 
Left up to me, I would interpret this to mean that the priority 
right does indeed attach to a “person” under Article 4(A)(1), but this 
is defined as a “person” is only protected if he or she makes a filing 
“adequate” to establish a priority date under the law of the country of 
filing. If the person who files later receives an assignment of the 
international priority right—or later adds new named inventors—the 
original filing is no less “adequate.” Even if the original-filing person 
ends up with more rights, or ends up being a different inventive entity, 
that person still made a valid priority filing. Domestic law says so, and 
the Paris Convention must follow this law. If the domestic jurisdiction 
is not hyper-technical with respect to the pre-filing assignments or 
post-filing adjustment in the inventive entity, Article 4 says this must 
be honoured. 
Therefore, if under U.S. law the original priority filing made in 
the United States is made by a “person” who has the right to file an 
application under U.S. law on the date of the priority filing, then that 
“person” (and/or its successors) properly obtains and possesses a right 
to priority. And so, references appearing after this priority date are not 
prior art to the invention claimed in the priority application. 
 
 41. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, supra note 10, 
at art. 4(A)(2)–(3). 
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A. Treaty Context and Interpretation 
Despite what I think is a perfectly plausible case for my reading 
of Article 4, I concede that there is room for a different approach. It 
might well be argued that in close cases, the “minimalist” nature of 
the Paris Convention’s surrender of sovereignty should come into 
play. Under this approach, even if I am right about the ultimate 
meaning of Article 4, considerable deference is due to national courts 
in interpreting what it means. The upshot, if this approach be taken, is 
this: only a national court interpretation that is facially impossible or 
absurd should result in condemnation or correction at the level of the 
Paris Union. A national court that interpreted the one-year priority 
period to mean nine months, for example, would fit this description. 
Beyond this quite unusual case, national courts would have to be given 
the final word on what the Paris Convention means. 
Another way to put this is that important domestic policies 
should be allowed to influence Treaty interpretations under a 
minimalist treaty such as Paris. It is evident from the European cases 
that the courts there consider the international priority right to be a 
distinctive “stick” in the inventor’s bundle of rights. They also seem 
to take the view that, to favor the situation of inventors, only explicit 
assignments of rights should be allowed to take away a right from an 
inventor. The latter view especially is consistent with longstanding 
continental traditions. Under a pro-personality—or Kantian—
approach to IP rights, the individual creator is the focus of attention 
and the favoured party before the courts. It is natural, when taking this 
view, to disfavor implied transfers of creators’ rights; this tends to 
divest creative people of the very rights they are thought to have 
earned through the act of creation. Thus, only when it is crystal clear 
that an inventor meant to surrender rights to an employer should such 
a transfer be given effect. 
Quite pragmatic arguments—of a distinctly American flavor—
may be made on the other side of this issue.42 The efficiency gains that 
follow from liberal concentration of rights in a single entity are well 
understood, and legal policy that favors this has been said to be 
superior to a “pro-inventor” strain of thought. Yet the whole point here 
is that this quite plausible approach must be limited to the U.S. context 
from which it springs. Because the Paris Convention does not ask 
much in the way of ceding national sovereignty, other sovereign 
 
 42. See Robert P. Merges, The Law and Economics of Employee Inventions, 
13 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 2–3 (1999) (presenting one such set of arguments). 
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members of the European Convention might be convinced to 
recognize that their domestic policies ought not be binding outside 
their home jurisdiction. This is, at least, a reasonable (if not 
unquestionably superior) approach to treaty interpretation.  
III. SOVEREIGNTY AFTER URUGUAY/TRIPS: CANADIAN UTILITY 
DOCTRINE43 
Having completed a case study under the Paris Convention, let 
us now take up a case for contrast. How should treaty interpretation 
work under the 1995 TRIPs Agreement? To see, we will use a current 
dispute over the utility requirement in Canada. 
In 2014, Eli Lilly Company charged the Government of Canada 
with violating the substantive patent harmonization standards of the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).44 Lilly’s complaint 
was that a newly developed version of the traditional utility 
requirement raised the standard for patentability far beyond Canada’s 
historical standard (in place when NAFTA and TRIPs were signed), 
and in fact beyond the consensus standard applied throughout the 
world.45 The text on which Lilly’s challenge is based, Article 17 of 
 
 43. Disclosure: I was an expert witness on U.S. patent law for Eli Lilly in this 
arbitration. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, Expert Report 
of Professor Robert P. Merges, ¶ 1 (Sept. 29, 2014); Transcript of Direct Presentation 
and Testimony of Professor Merges, Eli Lilly & Co. v. Gov’t of Canada, ICSID Case 
No. UNCT/14/2, 1278-1417 (June 3, 2016) [hereinafter Eli Lilly Arbitration]. See 
generally Eli Lilly & Co. v. Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, Second Expert 
Report of Professor Robert P. Merges (Sept. 10, 2015) [hereinafter Eli Lilly Second 
Expert Report]. 
 44. See Eli Lilly Arbitration, supra note 43, at ¶¶ 3–4; see also North 
American Free Trade Agreement art. 1709(1), Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (“[E]ach 
Party shall make patents available for any inventions, whether products or processes, 
in all fields of technology, provided that such inventions are new, result from an 
inventive step and are capable of industrial application.”). The final phrase—“capable 
of industrial application”—is explicitly defined as a precise synonym for “utility.” Id. 
It is this final requirement—“capable of industrial application”—that is at issue in the 
Eli Lilly case. Id. Note that NAFTA is currently scheduled to be replaced by a new 
U.S.–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA) negotiated in 2018 but not yet in effect. 
See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, United States-Mexico-Canada 
Agreement, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/united-states-
mexico-canada-agreement [https://perma.cc/K6DR-9H58] (last visited Mar. 2, 2020). 
 45. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Canada, Case No. UNCT/14/2, Claimant’s 
Memorial, ¶¶ 60–61 (Sept. 29, 2014) [hereinafter Claimant’s Memorial]. Lilly also 
argued that the actions of the Canadian courts violated other provisions of NAFTA. 
See id. A “Memorial” in a UNCITRAL or NAFTA arbitration is essentially a brief for 
a party to the arbitration. 
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NAFTA, is identical to the substantive harmonization standard in 
TRIPs.46 So, Lilly’s request could as easily have been framed as a 
challenge under TRIPs. Because TRIPs has much greater world 
coverage, I will analyze the Canadian utility doctrine as an alleged 
violation of TRIPs.47 
The Eli Lilly case against Canada raises a number of complex 
and important issues. At its heart, however, it poses a distinct 
challenge to Canadian national sovereignty: a private U.S.-based 
company is arguing that Canadian court interpretation of Canada’s 
patent statute has deviated from Canada’s treaty commitment to 
TRIPs. This is a striking claim. Can it be justified? Can Canada really 
have surrendered so much sovereign discretion in signing the TRIPs 
treaty that its own domestic courts are constrained in their 
development of statute-based case law under its national patent act? 
 
 46. TRIPS Article 27.1 states, “Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 2 and 
3 below, patents shall be available for any inventions, whether products or processes, 
in all fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and 
are capable of industrial application.” GATT, supra note 23, at art. 27.1. Footnote 
five, which comes at the end of this sentence, reads, “For the purposes of this Article, 
the terms ‘inventive step’ and ‘capable of industrial application’ may be deemed by a 
Member to be synonymous with the terms ‘non-obvious’ and ‘useful’ respectively.” 
Id. NAFTA Article 1709(1): 
Subject to paragraphs 2 and 3, each Party shall make patents available for 
any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, 
provided that such inventions are new, result from an inventive step and are 
capable of industrial application. For purposes of this Article, a Party may 
deem the terms “inventive step” and “capable of industrial application” to 
be synonymous with the terms “non-obvious” and “useful”, respectively. 
North American Free Trade Agreement, supra note 44, at art. 1709(1). 
 47. There are some procedural differences between the treaty enforcement 
mechanisms of NAFTA and TRIPS. NAFTA settles disputes through state-party 
investor dispute settlement arbitration panels, such as the one that will decide Eli Lilly 
v. Canada. See North American Free Trade Agreement, supra note 44, at 642–44. 
TRIPS on the other hand uses a Dispute Settlement Body, which is limited to state vs. 
state disputes. See WORLD TRADE ORG., Understanding the WTO: Settling Disputes, 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm [https://perma.cc/ 
N7ZR-JUUY] (last visited Mar. 2, 2020). At times, however, private investors may 
invoke TRIPS rules and norms in the context of bilateral investments treaties (BITs), 
under which state-investor disputes are often handled in arbitration or arbitration-like 
proceedings. See Henning Grosse Ruse-Kahn, Litigating Intellectual Property Rights 
in Investor-State Arbitration: From Plain Packaging to Patent Revocation, INV. 
TREATY NEWS (Nov. 18, 2014), http://www.iisd.org/itn/2014/11/18/litigating-
intellectual-property-rights-in-investor-state-arbitration-from-plain-packaging-to-
patent-revocation/ [https://perma.cc/ED7J-R5D5]. 
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On the other hand, if court-developed doctrine is unreachable 
under TRIPs, then what exactly does harmonization mean? If courts 
are free to interpret and adapt domestic law in the same way they 
always have, does TRIPs have any binding force or practical effect? 
In what follows I try to answer these questions. My position has 
two parts. First, only an extreme and egregious departure from 
harmonized rules will warrant a finding that TRIPs has been violated. 
Second, when this violation emanates from national courts, the nation 
as a whole is no less responsible for a remedy under TRIPs. A 
signatory such as Canada, in other words, must maintain adherence to 
the TRIPs treaty, whether treaty violations emanate from executive 
action, legislation, or court decisions. Because IP law is made at all 
levels of government, all levels must be held accountable for treaty 
violations. Put differently, there is nothing sacred about court-made 
law; if it results in a deviation from agreed-upon standards, it is still a 
violation of the treaty. And it must be remedied. 
A. Why Canadian Utility Doctrine Arguably Violated TRIPs 
Canadian patent law has deviated radically from traditional 
principles in place in Canada, the United States, and elsewhere for 
many years.48 Until the Canadian Supreme Court changed course 
recently, the basic standard of practical utility had been replaced in 
Canada with an imposingly high evidentiary standard for proof of 
utility, which goes under the name of the “promise of utility” 
doctrine.49 
Under the promise of utility doctrine, which was created in 
Canadian case law beginning in 2005, the invalidity rate for 
pharmaceutical patents far exceeds any outcome ever seen under 
traditional utility doctrine. Of the sixty-three pharmaceutical patent 
 
 48. See generally Prentice v. Dominion Rubber Co., [1928] Ex. C.R. 196 
(Can. Ex. Ct.) (emphasizing that a “slight amount” of utility is all that is required). 
 49. The “promise utility” doctrine that was the subject of the Eli Lilly 
NAFTA arbitration was—subsequent to resolution of that arbitration—unilaterally 
overruled by the Canadian Supreme Court. See AstraZeneca Canada Inc. v. Apotex 
Inc., [2017] 1 S.C.R. 943, ¶ 55 (Can. S.C.C.). 
The [Canadian Patent] Act does not prescribe the degree or quantum of 
usefulness required, or that every potential use be realized—a scintilla of 
utility will do. A single use related to the nature of the subject-matter is 
sufficient, and the utility must be established by either demonstration or 
sound prediction as of the filing date. 
Id. Thus although Eli Lilly ultimately lost in the NAFTA tribunal, its position 
prevailed soon afterward in the highest Canadian court. 
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cases since 2005 in which utility was raised as an invalidity defense, 
patents were invalidated in twenty-five cases. This invalidity rate of 
almost 40% is striking compared to historical norms. Utility is 
routinely described as a “low bar” or “minimalist standard.” And even 
though chemical and pharmaceutical cases form a large portion of 
those raising a serious utility issue, nothing like a 40% invalidity rate 
has ever been seen with this doctrine in any country that employs it. 
This is especially striking when comparing non-pharmaceutical 
cases in Canada. None of the eight non-pharmaceutical cases in 
Canada since 2005 have resulted in invalidation. This is not unusual; 
U.S. case law goes years without the report of a patent invalidated for 
lack of utility. Common sense, as well as expert statistical significance 
testing, shows that the Canadian utility doctrine is an extreme and 
unprecedented variant of traditional tests.50 It is extreme enough, in 
fact, that it quite arguably represents a deviation from the TRIPs 
treaty. The treaty requires that Canada and the other two signatory 
nations adhere to this principle: “[P]atents shall be available for any 
inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, 
provided that they are . . . capable of industrial application,” i.e., that 
they are useful.51 When a new, unprecedented super-utility test is 
introduced that goes radically far beyond the traditional test (in place 
when the Treaty was signed), that new test violates the treaty 
obligation. Patents are not available in Canada when a claimed 
invention is shown to be useful under traditional standards. Inventions 
must be super-useful (i.e., shown to fulfill the “promise” inherent in 
the patent specification) to be patentable there. TRIPs forbids this. 
How does the “promise” doctrine work? It was the basis, for 
example, of the Canadian court decision invalidating Eli Lilly’s 
Canadian atomexetine (Straterra) patent (Number 2,209,735) (‘735 
patent), which covered treatments of Attention Deficit Hyperactivity 
Disorder (ADHD). That patent claimed, using a standard pharma 
patent claim format, “A method of treating attention-
deficit/hyperactivity disorder comprising administering to a patient in 
need of such treatment an effective amount of tomoxetine.”52 The 
patentee introduced evidence of an FDA Phase I pilot study of twenty-
 
 50. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, Expert 
Report of Professor Bruce Levin (Sept. 7, 2015) (reporting raw data and statistical 
significance tests). 
 51. GATT, supra note 23, at art. 27.1. 
 52. Treatment of Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder, U.S. Patent No. 
5,658,590, col. 4 l. 24–26 (filed Jan. 11, 1995) (issued Aug. 19, 1997). 
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one patients treated with atomexetine over a period of seven weeks.53 
Eleven of the twenty-one patients studied showed a 30% or greater 
reduction in ADHD symptoms during the study.54  
Traditional utility standards do not require FDA studies of any 
kind to demonstrate utility.55 The mere announcement of a pending 
Phase I study is taken, under the USPTO MPEP, as per se evidence of 
utility. Yet the Canadian courts found that (1) the ‘735 patent 
“promises” treatment of chronic ADHD lasting over a long period of 
time;56 and (2) the pilot study, showing only short-term efficacy, failed 
to prove the “promised” utility.57 The proof of efficacy asked for under 
 
 53. T. Spencer et al., An Open-label, Dose-ranging Study of Atomoxetine in 
Children with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, 11 J. OF CHILD & 
ADOLESCENT PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 251, 251 (2001). 
 54. Id. 
 55. In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1995). U.S. law also does not 
require any proof of a high degree of efficacy, either; only bare “workability” is called 
for. See, e.g., Transco Prods. Inc. v. Performance Contracting, Inc., No. 96-1336, 1997 
U.S. App. LEXIS 21294, at *5 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 13, 1997) (“[O]nly when a claimed 
invention has total incapacity to achieve what is claimed is it deemed inoperable.”); 
see also Tol-O-Matic, Inc. v. Proma Produkt-Und Mktg. Gesellschaft, 945 F.2d 1546, 
1553 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“It is not required that a particular characteristic set forth in 
the prosecution history be achieved in order to satisfy § 101 [utility].”). 
 56. Novopharm Ltd. v. Eli Lilly & Co., [2010] F.C. 915, ¶ 93 (Can. Fed. Ct.), 
aff’d, [2011] F.C.A. 220 (“[U]tility is assessed against the inventive promise of the 
patent. An invention is only useful if it does what the inventor claims it will do. In this 
case the requirement of utility would be met if, at the Canadian filing date of the ‘735 
Patent, there was sufficient evidence that atomoxetine was clinically useful in treating 
some patients with ADHD or, alternatively, that such efficacy could be soundly 
predicted.”). 
 57. Novopharm Ltd. v. Eli Lilly & Co., [2011] F.C.A. 220, ¶ 36 (Can. Fed. 
Ct.). The Court of Appeals, affirming the trial court, made this clear: “[When the trial 
court judge said that treatment of chronic ADHD was ‘implicit in the promise’ made, 
to treat ADHD,] he was simply interpreting what ‘treatment’ means in this patent in 
the context of ADHD, a chronic disorder requiring sustained treatment.” Id. at ¶ 21. 
The heightened standard being applied was also evidence from the Court of Appeals’ 
statements about the degree of utility required to meet the “promise” doctrine: 
A POSITA [person of skill in the art] would thus understand the promise to 
mean that atomoxetine will alleviate the symptoms of the disorder in some 
patients to a clinically meaningful extent. This is not to say that the promise 
means that clinicians will necessarily prescribe atomoxetine for their 
patients, because there may be more effective medicines available on the 
market. The promise does mean, however, that atomoxetine would be 
regarded by a physician as a realistic option for the treatment of ADHD. 
Id. at ¶ 23.  
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Canadian doctrine is far above any recognizable, traditional test 
applied in Canada before 2005, and applied elsewhere to this day.58 
One case doesn’t make for a TRIPs violation, of course, but this 
is quite representative. Scholars and practitioners in Canada noted the 
rise of the unprecedented “promise” doctrine and the dire 
consequences for pharmaceutical patents that it entailed. The statistics 
quoted earlier show these observers were not out of line. The simple 
fact is that the “promise” doctrine is a complete aberration with respect 
to worldwide utility tests. 
Further proof can be found in this fact. Another successful Eli 
Lilly product, Zyprexa (olanzapine), treats depression. Lilly filed 
patent applications in eighty-one separate countries, given the 
potentially large market for depression treatments.59 The patent was 
granted (found valid) in every country, and challenged for invalidity 
in twenty-four countries. It was found valid after challenge in all 
 
 58. See id. Neither of the Canadian court’s statements is consistent with the 
traditional test of utility. In the U.S. case of Cross v. Iizuka, for example, the Federal 
Circuit specifically rejected the argument that the invention in question lacked utility 
due to the absence of proof of therapeutic (i.e., clinical) effectiveness: 
Cross’ position is that the stated purpose or sole contemplated utility of the 
invention of Iizuka is to provide a novel class of compounds which provide 
“practical use” as “therapeutical medicines for diseases caused by 
thromboxane A2,” and therefore the Board erred in its finding as to the 
stated utility of the Japanese priority application.  
753 F.2d 1040, 1045 (Fed. Cir. 1985). The Federal Circuit held, 
The Board has found that the Japanese priority application of Iizuka 
disclosed a practical utility for the [claimed] compounds . . . in the inhibition 
of thromboxane synthetase in human or bovine platelet microsomes, i.e., an 
in vitro utility. Clearly, this stated utility as found by the Board has been 
delimited with sufficient specificity to satisfy the threshold requirements of 
[earlier cases]. The stated utility of the Japanese priority application is 
directed to a specific pharmacological activity possessed by the [claimed] 
imidazole derivatives . . . the inhibition of thromboxane synthetase in vitro. 
Id. at 1048. It is manifest that no responsible doctor would extrapolate from 
effectiveness in the lab against “platelet microsomes” to a fully safe and effective 
compound to administer to a suffering human being. Id. Yet that is the standard set up 
by the promise doctrine in the context of this patent: the claimed compound must be 
“regarded by a physician as a realistic option for the treatment of ADHD.” 
Novopharm, [2011] F.C.A. 220, at ¶ 36. This standard is so far beyond operability 
that it really has little to do with the classical law of utility. It carries the ring of an 
FDA clinical approval standard. This may be a good standard to apply before drugs 
are approved for the market but it has little to do with historically established tests for 
utility in patent law. 
 59. See Eli Lilly Second Expert Report, supra note 43, at ¶ 47.  
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countries60 but one—Canada—where it was invalidated for failure to 
meet the “promise” standard for utility.61 The extensive clinical testing 
reported in the specification was not enough to establish utility in 
Canada; instead, some comments about better activity and fewer side 
effects (in the specification, not the claims) were seized on as an 
unfulfilled “promise.”62 
B. On Not “Freezing” Doctrinal Development in National Courts: 
“Normal” Doctrinal Variation Versus Radical Doctrinal 
Abrogation/Revolution 
One obvious counterargument to the point made here is that 
signing a treaty should not “freeze” national doctrinal development. 
So yes, Canada agreed to employ the “capable of industrial use” 
(utility) standard, among others, in granting patents after TRIPs took 
effect. But this cannot mean that the permissible boundaries and 
features of Canadian utility doctrine were frozen for all time when it 
joined TRIPs in 1995. 
But if Canada has deviated, so has the United States, right? 
Under this theory, the United States is arguably wildly out of 
compliance also. The doctrine of equivalents has shrunk in the United 
States since 1995. The written description requirement has been either 
revived or invented, depending on your view; but in any event, § 112 
jurisprudence is very different today than it was in 1994. Injunctions 
are no longer automatic after eBay Inc. v. MercExchange. L.L.C.63 
Willfulness, inequitable conduct, damages, and nonobviousness have 
all changed in important ways under U.S. law after 1995. 
 
 60. Lilly’s patents for Zyprexa were upheld everywhere other than Slovenia 
(where a single claim as found to lack novelty) and Saudi Arabia (where priority dates 
were the basis of invalidation, but where a Gulf Cooperation Council patent remained 
valid and enforceable). 
 61. Eli Lilly Canada Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., [2011] F.C. 1288, ¶ 209 (Can. 
Fed. Ct.). This opinion is remarkable for (1) admitting that the Zyprexa patent met the 
traditional Canadian utility standard (the “scintilla of utility” test), but (2) was not 
useful under the “promise” doctrine, (3) despite numerous human studies on safety 
and a pilot study of eight patients on efficacy, where six of the eight patients showed 
a positive response to the treatment of depression. Again, the culprit was the 
artificially high “promise” of the patent. Id. In the court’s words, “the promise of the 
patent is that olanzapine treats schizophrenia patients in the clinic in a markedly 
superior fashion with a better side-effects profile than other known antipsychotics.” 
Id. This despite the fact that the claim in the patent made no mention of “marked 
superiority” or superior side-effects profile. 
 62. Id. 
 63. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). 
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One thing to note at the outset is that the TRIPs text only 
specifically mentions four requirements for granting patents. Recall 
that Article 27.1 says “[s]ubject to the provisions of paragraphs 2 and 
3, patents shall be available for any inventions, whether products or 
processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they are new, 
involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial application.”64 
This paragraph constrains WTO member nations to apply at least these 
four patent doctrines: (1) patentable subject matter (“all fields of 
technology”); (2) novelty; (3) inventive step/nonobviousness; and (4) 
capable of industrial application/utility. Having said this, two points 
must be made. First, there are unquestionably a number of traditional 
patent requirements which are not listed, most importantly, 
disclosure/enablement. Second, when the treaty mandates that patents 
“shall be available for any inventions . . . provided that they are new, 
involve an inventive step, and are [useful],” how tightly does this 
constrain the course of development in the case law regarding these 
standards?65 
The first question is an interesting one. It is not apparent in the 
record of either NAFTA or TRIPs why this list was included, but other 
standards (such as disclosure) were left out. Perhaps disclosure varies 
more widely than these four “core” requirements. In any event there 
is a good case to be made that the exclusion of disclosure from the 
mandatory list leaves more room for doctrinal variation in this area 
 
 64. GATT, supra note 23, art. 27.1. The paragraphs 2 and 3 referred to in the 
text carve out patentable subject matter areas over which signatory nations retain 
complete discretion: 
2. Members may exclude from patentability inventions, the prevention 
within their territory of the commercial exploitation of which is necessary 
to protect ordre public or morality, including to protect human, animal or 
plant life or health or to avoid serious prejudice to the environment, 
provided that such exclusion is not made merely because the exploitation is 
prohibited by their law. 
3. Members may also exclude from patentability: 
(a) diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment of 
humans or animals; 
(b) plants and animals other than micro-organisms, and essentially 
biological processes for the production of plants or animals other than 
non-biological and microbiological processes. However, Members 
shall provide for the protection of plant varieties either by patents or 
by an effective sui generis system or by any combination thereof. The 
provisions of this subparagraph shall be reviewed four years after the 
date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement. 
Id. at arts. 27.2–27.3. 
 65. Id. at art. 27.1. 
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across countries. As long as disclosure doctrine does not in effect 
exclude an entire area of technology, for example, it might be 
defensible even if it changes considerably in scope in the years after 
accession to TRIPs. 
On the question of the permissible degree of variation in the 
listed doctrines, here an argument may be made based on accepted 
standards of interpretation in international law. The basic law of treaty 
interpretation is set out in the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties.66 Article 31.1 of the Vienna Convention says, “A treaty shall 
be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning 
to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of 
its object and purpose.”67 The “ordinary meaning . . . in . . . context” 
of terms such as novelty, inventive step, and utility, includes the 
normal, traditional degree of doctrinal variation present and accepted 
at the time the treaty is signed.68 But it does not include radical and 
extreme departures from the ordinary meaning in context. Thus, the 
text supports a degree of doctrinal variation that is within the 
parameters of accepted practice in the relevant field. But it excludes 
unprecedented and radical departures from this degree of variation. 
TRIPs thus permits normal variation around the core content of 
traditional patentability requirements. A slight tightening in the 
nonobviousness test after the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in KSR 
International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.69 is a good example. This arguably 
restored U.S. law to its traditional contours, which had been modified 
by the Federal Circuit through the device of the “teaching, suggestion, 
or motivation” (TSM) test.70 Empirical research shows that in the 
immediate aftermath of KSR, the Federal Circuit invalidated patents at 
a rate eleven percentage points higher than before KSR.71 Even 
 
 66. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, Jan. 27, 1980, 115 
U.N.T.S. 331, 340. 
 67. Id. at art. 31.1. 
 68. Id. 
 69. See 550 U.S. 398, 419 (2007) (holding that obviousness is a general 
principle rather than a rigid rule). 
 70. Taryn Elliott, Post-KSR Obviousness: The Effects of the Patent and 
Trademark Office’s Exemplary Rationales on Patent Litigation, 16 GEO. MASON L. 
REV. 1011, 1094 (2009) (“KSR did not create a fundamental change in the obviousness 
standard; it merely shifted the focus back to the Graham [v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 
1 (1966)] factors and established a standard that is flexible enough to protect the 
policies underlying the obviousness inquiry.”). 
 71. Jason Rantanen, The Federal Circuit’s New Obviousness Jurisprudence: 
An Empirical Study, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 709, 737 (2013) (reporting an increase 
from 46% to 57% in findings of obviousness on appeal and comparing the pre-KSR 
and post-KSR periods). 
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assuming this is a permanent change in U.S. law, and not a temporary 
response to a recent Supreme Court opinion, it does not represent a 
radical re-writing of what it means for an invention to be nonobvious. 
It represents instead the normal variation around a core concept of 
patentability. 
Now compare this to the changes wrought by Canada’s promise 
utility doctrine. Eli Lilly’s data show that the rate of inutility rulings 
in pharmaceutical cases in Canada increased from essentially 0% to 
40% after the advent of the promise utility doctrine.72 This represents 
not normal legal variation, but a seismic change in the fabric of the 
law. Further evidence of the radical nature of the promise utility 
doctrine comes in the fate of the two Eli Lilly patents mentioned 
earlier. They have survived patent office review in a large number of 
countries, as well as litigation in others. Each of these national patent 
systems applies standard tests of patentability, though naturally some 
small degree of variation is assumed and permitted under TRIPs. The 
outcome of a cross-jurisdictional analysis of the validity of the 
Zyprexa and Strattera patents yields a generally uniform result—the 
patents are valid, and upheld where challenged, particularly with 
regard to utility.73 
There is one glaring exception: Canada. As these case studies 
suggest, and as the aggregate data show convincingly, Canadian law 
has evolved what amounts to an additional, and very rigorous, test of 
patentability that invalidates a large portion of pharmaceutical patents. 
This is not normal legal variation. It is a striking legal innovation. It 
renders Canadian law highly divergent from the worldwide norm. 
Whatever this new test is called, it represents a radical departure from 
traditional concepts of utility. And that makes it, quite arguably, a 
violation of the TRIPs Agreement. 
CONCLUSION 
There are several points to take home from all this: (1) the Paris 
Convention of 1883 was a minimalist Treaty, requiring a minimum of 
state sovereignty to be surrendered during and after the Treaty-making 
process; (2) TRIPs in 1995 was quite a bit more substantive, and 
required a concomitant cession of national discretion; and (3) the two 
different contexts strongly imply an interpretive rule in close cases. 
Regarding this latter point, under the Paris Convention, states retain 
 
 72. Claimant’s Memorial, supra note 45, at ¶ 222. 
 73. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
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discretion unless the Treaty very clearly provides otherwise, as with 
the right of international priority, while under TRIPs, greater 
constraints on state discretion are permitted and assumed to be part of 
the bargain states struck when they signed TRIPs and joined the WTO. 
The TRIPs interpretive bias means that states made real 
commitments when they joined. The case of the promise doctrine in 
Canada is illustrative.74 Though at least some of the aberrant case 
outcomes I described might have been reached through alternative 
doctrines, over which greater national discretion was reserved by 
TRIPs, application of traditional utility principles to reach results 
completely at odds with traditional requirements arguably represents 
a violation of TRIPs. Extreme variation from accepted norms at the 
time of accession, amounting to a complete rewriting of one of the 
agreed-upon requirements for patentability, can violate the Treaty. 
This is not equivalent to saying that TRIPs froze all doctrinal variation 
in signatory countries as of 1994. Traditional variation around core 
principles was and remains a part of patent law, even after TRIPs. In 
addition, of course, the Treaty itself can be revised.75 So, nations that 
sign TRIPs can do a number of things to change patent doctrine, in 
ways that do not violate the Treaty. They can vary doctrine around 
traditional core principles, they can change doctrine in areas not 
covered by the Treaty, and they can suggest amendments to the Treaty. 
What they cannot do is purport to apply traditional principles in 
ways that violate the basic premises and traditional contours of those 
principles. This they committed to foreswear when they acceded to 
TRIPs. Under the Paris Convention, much greater leeway can and 
should be given in these instances but not under TRIPs. The very 
different postures and contexts of the two Treaties point to different 
degrees of national discretion in IP policy. 
 
 74. Another intriguing case is section 101 jurisprudence in the United States. 
Arguably, if recent Supreme Court cases are applied strictly, the United States might 
be said to be in violation of Article 27, requiring patents to be available in “all fields 
of technology.” GATT, supra note 23, art. 27.1. It may be too early yet to say whether 
U.S. doctrine in this area has clearly become violative of Article 27. And some recent 
case law in the software suggests that the recent Court cases may not be applied so 
strictly as to eliminate software from the domain of patentability. But this area bears 
watching for purposes of TRIPs compliance. 
 75. See HOLGER HESTERMEYER, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE WTO: THE CASE OF 
PATENTS AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES 256, 274 (2007) (describing “Doha Declaration” 
and subsequent TRIPs amendment of Article 31 in 2005, allowing export of 
pharmaceutical products from signatory nations, so as to facilitate application of an 
appropriate compulsory licensing in an importing country). 
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Nations may exercise the right to value IP-protected creations, 
and one way they may do so is to surrender some of their sovereignty 
by joining a treaty. But the treaty context can and should be taken into 
account when analyzing national duties and requirements under those 
treaties. The choice to accede to a treaty that has its purpose the award 
of private rights expresses important public values on the part of each 
signatory nation. But the use of a private law instrument—a state-
backed property right—has consequences. It may constrain post-
signing discretion in various ways. That is simply the price to be paid 
when the vehicle chosen to express national values is a private right 
awarded to individuals. Property grants no doubt embody significant 
public values. But to give effect to this choice, where a treaty such as 
TRIPs requires significant constraints on national discretion, those 
constraints must have some teeth. Otherwise the private rights that 
emerge from the IP-granting process will have little reliable value. 
And that undermines the public values embodied in the treaty 
commitment in the first place. 
 
